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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-4352 
 ___________ 
 
JESSE J. AVERHART, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CWA UNION LOCAL 1033; RAE ROEDER;  
DIANE SPENCE-BROWN; ANTHONY MISKOWSKI;  
DENNIS REITTER; CWA UNION; LAWRENCE COHEN;  
ANNIE HILL; CHRISTOPHER SHELTON 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-01093) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 1, 2014 
 
 Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 3, 2014) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jesse J. Averhart appeals from the District Court’s order denying his motion to 
disqualify defense counsel from joint representation and to prohibit the payment of 
 2 
certain appellees’ legal fees in this litigation with union funds.  We will dismiss this 
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
I. 
  Averhart is a member of the Communications Workers of America (“CWA”) and 
its local chapter Communications Workers of America Local 1033 (“CWA Local”).  He 
unsuccessfully ran for president of CWA Local in 2005, 2008 and 2011.  After the 2011 
election, Averhart filed suit pro se against CWA, CWA Local, and certain officers of 
each entity.  (Averhart previously filed suit against many of the same defendants at 
D.N.J. Civ. No. 3-10-cv-06163, which remains pending, but that suit is not relevant for 
present purposes.)  Averhart alleges various forms of mismanagement and misconduct, 
including misconduct in connection with the 2011 election.  CWA and its officers are 
represented by the same counsel in this litigation.  CWA Local’s separate counsel 
represents CWA Local’s officers as well. 
 At issue here is a motion that Averhart filed seeking an order (1) disqualifying 
counsel from jointly representing the union entities and their officers, and (2) enjoining 
the union entities from paying their officers’ legal fees in this litigation.  The District 
Court denied both requests.  The District Court concluded that joint representation is 
permissible under the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct because Averhart’s 
claims likely do not present a conflict of interest between the union entities and their 
officers.  The District Court further concluded that, because joint representation is 
permissible, there is no basis to enjoin the union entities from paying their officers’ legal 
 3 
fees.  The District Court later denied Averhart’s motion for reconsideration of its ruling, 
and Averhart appeals.  After the parties filed their briefs on the merits, we sua sponte 
raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction and the parties have filed supplemental briefs 
addressing that issue. 
II. 
 Averhart raises no argument directed to the denial of reconsideration, and we thus 
confine our consideration to the District Court’s underlying order.  In his supplemental 
brief, Averhart concedes that this Court presently lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 to review the District Court’s denial of his request to disqualify counsel, and he has 
expressly withdrawn his appeal to that extent.  (Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 1-2.)1  Thus, we 
are left with the District Court’s denial of Averhart’s request to prohibit the union entities 
from paying their officers’ legal fees.  Averhart argues that the District Court’s ruling is 
immediately appealable as the refusal of an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  The 
defendants counter that the District Court’s ruling does not qualify, and we agree. 
 “We have held that section 1292(a)(1) should be construed narrowly so as not to 
swallow the final-judgment rule.”  In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 392 
                                                 
1
 Averhart’s concession is correct because “a district court’s order denying a motion to 
disqualify counsel is not appealable under § 1291 prior to final judgment in the 
underlying litigation.”  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 
(1981).  The Supreme Court has not ruled out the use of mandamus to challenge an order 
denying disqualification of counsel in exceptional circumstances, see id. at 378 n.13, but 
Averhart has neither filed a mandamus petition nor mentioned mandamus through two 
rounds of briefing and has instead withdrawn his challenge to this portion of the District 
Court’s order.  We nevertheless note that Averhart has not raised any exceptional 
circumstance that might warrant mandamus relief. 
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(3d Cir. 2006).  Thus, although Averhart framed his request as one for injunctive relief 
and the District Court treated it as such, “the label used by the district court is not 
dispositive.”  Id. at 393.  Instead, a District Court’s order does not constitute an 
injunction or refusal of an injunction under § 1292(a)(1) unless, inter alia, it grants or 
denies a request to “accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief sought by the 
complaint.”  Id. at 392 (quotation marks omitted).  Orders do not constitute injunctions or 
refusals of injunctions if they merely “concern[] the conduct of the parties or their 
counsel, unrelated to the substantive relief sought.”  Id. at 393 (quotation marks omitted). 
 The District Court’s denial of Averhart’s request falls into the second category 
because his complaint does not mention the union entities’ payment of legal fees, let 
alone seek any relief on that basis.  To the contrary, Averhart’s complaint asserts that 
defendants have breached contracts and their fiduciary duties and otherwise violated the 
law in ways relating primarily to management of the union entities and the 2011 election.  
These claims, which are summarized in the margin,
2
 are not based on and do not seek 
                                                 
2
 Averhart claims that:  (1) the CWA defendants violated the federal Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”) by failing to provide notice of the terms of 
the LMRDA to union members; (2) the CWA defendants violated the LMRDA and the 
CWA constitution by failing to organize workers, maintain active subcommittees, fully 
disclose the CWA’s finances, ensure the adoption of local election rules, or review the 
results of and procedures employed during local elections; (3) the CWA officers refused 
to rectify the CWA Local officer defendants’ alleged misappropriation of member dues 
by denying Averhart’s requests for auditing and an accounting; (4) all defendants caused 
Averhart to expend his own funds on an allegedly tainted election; and the foregoing acts 
constitute (5) breaches of fiduciary duty and (6) breaches of contract.  (ECF No. 1 at 24-
29.)  Averhart seeks injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief in connection with these 
claims.  (Id. at 29-31.)  In particular, he seeks ten specific forms of injunctive relief, and 
none of them relates to any payment by the union entities of their officers’ legal fees.  (Id. 
at 29-30.) 
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relief from the union entities’ payment of legal fees. 
 Averhart nevertheless contends that the District Court’s ruling “touches the merits 
of part of the complaint,” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1997), because  
(1) his complaint alleges certain breaches of contract and fiduciary duty, (2) the union 
entities’ payment of legal fees constitutes an additional breach, and (3) his complaint 
requests “[s]uch other and further relief as may be deemed just, proper and appropriate.”  
(ECF No. 1 at 31.)  In Anderson, however, the District Court’s order constituted an 
injunction under § 1292(a)(1) because it expressly granted the plaintiff’s request to enjoin 
conduct that he expressly raised and for which he expressly sought relief in his 
complaint.  See Anderson, 125 F.3d at 153, 155; see also, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers’ 
Int’l Ass’n Local 19 v. Herre Bros, Inc., 201 F.3d 231, 237-38 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); 
Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1462, 1464 
(3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (same).  Such is not the case here.
3
 
 Indeed, Averhart all but concedes as much.  Averhart argues that, in the absence of 
preliminary relief, and “[i]f [the officers] are unsuccessful in defending this matter, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3
 We acknowledge that two decisions on which Averhart relies on the merits reviewed 
preliminary injunctions prohibiting unions from paying their officers’ legal fees.  See 
Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1967); Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 
107 v. Cohen, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960).  Those decisions are not controlling.  Neither 
decision discussed jurisdiction or specified whether the District Court’s order awarded 
relief that the plaintiff requested in the complaint, and both were decided long before we  
first expressly imposed that requirement in our en banc decision in Cohen, 867 F.2d at 
1465 & n.9.   
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appellant or the union would have to bring a separate action to recover unauthorized 
expenditure of union funds.”  (Appellant’s Supp. Reply Br. at 11) (emphasis added).  We 
express no opinion on the merits of such a separate action, but Averhart’s recognition that 
it would be required shows that the union entities’ payment of legal fees is not related to 
any of the relief that he requests in his complaint.
4
 
 Nor did the District Court’s denial of Averhart’s request otherwise relate to the 
merits of his claims.  To the contrary, the District Court declined to prohibit the union 
entities from paying their officers’ legal fees on the sole ground that joint representation 
is permissible under the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct.  That ruling has no 
bearing on the merits of Averhart’s claims and is instead inextricably intertwined with the 
District Court’s denial of Averhart’s request for the disqualification of counsel, which is 
not presently appealable.  See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d 
1272, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that order enjoining litigation in another forum did 
not constitute an injunction under § 1292(a)(1) because, inter alia, it related to a separate 
interlocutory venue ruling and not to the substance of the complaint). 
 Finally, Averhart argues that the union entities’ payment of legal fees is related to 
his complaint because he sought to enjoin such payment in order “to protect the remedies 
sought in the complaint,” apparently because he believes that his claims against the 
officers will fare better in this litigation if the officers are denied union funding.  
                                                 
4
 Such an action was the subject of the case on which Averhart relies most heavily on the 
merits.  See Urichuck v. Clark, 689 F.2d 40, 41 (3d Cir. 1982) (addressing union’s 
payment of its officers’ legal fees after union member “filed suit under Title V of the 
LMRDA . . . to prohibit union payment of the officers’ counsel fees in [a separate] suit”).   
 7 
(Appellant’s Supp. Reply Br. at 7.)  We rejected a similar argument in Pressman-Gutman.  
In that case, the plaintiff employer argued that the District Court’s order appointing a 
guardian ad litem for its profit-sharing plan constituted an injunction under § 1292(a)(1) 
because that ruling was “intended to prevent adverse effects upon the Plan’s avenues for 
obtaining relief” in the litigation and thus was designed “to protect the substantive relief 
sought.”  In re Pressman-Gutman, 459 F.3d at 392 (quotation marks omitted).  We 
rejected that argument because “[s]uch a broad reading of section 1292(a)(1) would 
undermine the limited exception to the final judgment rule that section 1292(a)(1) carves 
out.”  Id. at 393.  We reject Averhart’s argument in this case for the same reason.5 
 For these reasons, we will dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  
Averhart’s motion for a stay of proceedings in the District Court or an injunction pending 
appeal is denied. 
                                                 
5
 Averhart has not argued that the District Court’s ruling is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and the collateral order doctrine, but we have considered that possibility and 
conclude that it is not.  The District Court’s ruling did not determine (conclusively or 
otherwise) whether the union entities’ payment of their officers’ legal fees is authorized 
under the contracts and provisions of law on which Averhart relies.  See In re Pressman-
Gutman, 459 F.3d at 395 (collateral order must, inter alia, “conclusively determine the 
disputed question”) (quotation marks omitted). 
